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Supererogation and Conditional Obligation 
Daniel Muñoz (UNC Chapel Hill) and Theron Pummer (St Andrews) 
Abstract: There are plenty of classic paradoxes about conditional obligations, like 
the duty to be gentle if one is to murder, and about “supererogatory” deeds beyond 
the call of duty. But little has been said about the intersection of these topics. We 
develop the first general account of conditional supererogation, with the power to 
solve familiar puzzles as well as several that we introduce. Our account, moreover, 
flows from two familiar ideas: that conditionals restrict quantification and that 
supererogation emerges from a clash between justifying and requiring reasons. 
 
1. Introduction 
The point of morality—if it has one—is to guide our actions. Moral guidance usually comes in the 
form of obligations, which steer us away from wrongs like theft and murder. But wrongdoers need 
guidance, too. For their sake, morality issues conditional obligations. For example: if you are 
going to murder, you must do it gently. What makes this obligation “conditional” is that it applies 
given a certain condition—in this case, your murdering. What makes it “contrary-to-duty” is that 
the condition is a wrong action (Chisholm 1963). There are also what we call “consistent-with-
duty” conditional obligations, like the obligation to wear a seatbelt if driving. These provide 
guidance to those who have ruled out a non-obligatory option, like taking the train. 
The study of conditional obligations like these has been animated by a stock of paradoxes. 
The “gentle murder” paradox, for example, involves a tempting inference known as “factual 
detachment.” If you are going to murder, then you must do it gently; and, in fact, you are going to 
murder. Does that mean you must commit a gentle murder? Clearly, this cannot follow (Forrester 
1984; cf. Jackson 1985: 191-92; McNamara 2019). The classic task is to explain why. 
Contemporary work on conditional obligations has been in fruitful dialogue with the 
flourishing study of conditionals (see e.g., Smith 1993; Bonevac 1998; McNamara 2010).1 Also 
                                               
1 We focus on conditionals whose antecedents, intuitively, restrict the options that an agent will consider in 
practical deliberation (e.g., “if you are not going to save both strangers, you must save one”), and whose 
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flourishing is the literature on obligation—both as a topic in itself, and especially in relation to 
“supererogatory” acts that lie beyond its call. But this work has not been put in contact with the 
inquiry into conditional moral judgments. Our task in this paper is to fill this lacuna, seeking a 
general account of conditional judgments fit for the supererogatory, and laying out some hard cases 
with which any such account must contend.2 
We argue that every existing principle struggles with at least some of the hard cases: either 
consistent-with-duty conditional obligation (§2), consistent-with-duty conditional supererogation 
(§3), or contrary-to-duty conditional supererogation (§4). We then develop a principle that can 
handle them all. Our principle combines a familiar conception of conditionals (as restrictors on 
quantification) with a key resource from the theory of supererogation—namely, the idea that 
permissibility depends on the balance of “requiring reasons” and “justifying reasons” (§5). 
 
2. From Obligation to Conditional Obligation 
Let’s start by thinking about conditional obligations in simple choices involving supererogation. 
A supererogatory act, like a kindly favor or saintly sacrifice, is permissible and yet better than a 
permissible alternative—it goes “beyond the call of duty.” The supererogatory contrasts with the 
                                               
consequents ascribe a deontic status to an option in their option set. We set aside “obligations,” stated with 
anankastic conditionals, that merely express how to achieve a certain end (e.g., “if you want to get the job, 
you have to interview”); see Greenspan 1975; von Fintel & Iatridou 2005; Condoravdi & Lauer 2016. There 
is also a thriving literature on indicative conditionals whose antecedents provide information about the 
situation (e.g., “if the miners are trapped in Shaft A...”), and whose consequents involve obligations that 
are sensitive to that information; see Kolodny & MacFarlane 2010; von Fintel 2012: 22–30; Cariani et al. 
2013; Charlow 2013. Another kind of conditional obligation, less central in moral theory, arises in what 
Schwager (2006: 242) calls a “relevance conditional,” whose antecedent “filters out one of the conditions 
(typically relevance) under which the speech act arising from an utterance of the consequent in the given 
context would be appropriate.” For example, “If I may be honest, you shouldn’t quit your day job.” 
2 Our work owes a debt to Paul McNamara, who has done more than anyone to develop a deontic logic for 
supererogation; see Mares & McNamara 1997; McNamara 1996, 2011a, 2011b. But his semantics in these 
papers, with its transitive ranking on the worlds permissible to bring about, is too restrictive for the puzzles 
in §§2–4. (For his latest thinking, see McNamara forthcoming.) 
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“moral minimum,” i.e., the minimally decent permissible option (McNamara 1996).3 
We begin with a three-way choice: supererogating, doing the moral minimum, and doing 
wrong. Suppose that two people, both strangers to you, are trapped in a collapsing building, and 
while you can easily and costlessly save one of them, saving both would involve serious harm to 
you—say, losing your legs. You thus have three options: Save Two (supererogatory), Save One 
(less good but still permissible), and Save Zero (wrong). Clearly, you aren’t obligated to Save One, 
since you may instead Save Two. But if you won’t Save Two, then you must Save One. It would 
be wrong to gratuitously let the other stranger die.  
We can capture this with a bridge principle between non-conditional and conditional 
obligations. (We write ‘OB(B/¬A)’ to mean that B is obligatory conditional on not doing A.) 
 
NOTHING ELSE LEFT: If A and B are your only permissible options, OB(B/¬A).4 
 
The more general idea is that you are conditionally obligated to do something if, given the 
conditions, it is the only (non-conditionally) permissible option left.5 
But as nice as it sounds, NOTHING ELSE LEFT appears to be open to counterexamples that 
feature certain consistent-with-duty conditionals (the principle is silent about contrary-to-duty 
conditionals). Consider a case known for giving rise to the “All or Nothing Problem” (Horton 
                                               
3 We focus on “moral supererogation,” which is morally better than the moral minimum, as opposed to 
“rational supererogation,” which is rationally better than the rational minimum (see Benn & Bales 2019). 
4 Horton 2017: 96. He states his principle in terms of contrastive obligation (to do one act rather than 
another), but elsewhere (94) implies that it is equivalent to our formulation. (Note that he does not present 
NOTHING ELSE LEFT as a general account of conditional obligations.) 
5 When we say “permissible” (rather than “conditionally permissible”) outside of the consequent of a 
conditional, we mean plain old non-conditional permissibility. Mutatis mutandis for “supererogatory,” 
“obligatory,” and “wrong.” We prefer “non-conditional” to “unconditional” because “unconditionally 
permissible” sounds like it means “permissible no matter what,” which is not the intended meaning. 
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2017).6 We again have a collapsing building with two strangers trapped inside, but now you’ll lose 
your legs whether you save one stranger or save both—saving zero remains costless. You have 
three options: Save Zero (no cost), Save One (costs you your legs), or Save Two (costs you your 
legs). In this collapsing building case you are plausibly permitted to Save Zero, as this is the only 
way to keep your legs. Moreover, it seems clear that Save One is wrong, because Save Two is far 
better and no costlier. Again, it’s wrong to gratuitously let the other stranger die.7  
Those are your obligations. What about your conditional obligations? Here is where the 
problem starts. If you won’t Save Two, it seems you have only one permissible option left—Save 
Zero. But does it follow that, if you won’t save everyone, you must save none (rather than saving 
one)? That seems perverse. This is the All or Nothing Problem, and its core is NOTHING ELSE LEFT. 
It is true that you have only two permissible options: saving “all” or saving “nothing,” but it 
shouldn’t follow that you must choose nothing if you won’t choose all.8 
 
3. Is “Next Best” Good Enough? 
To solve the All or Nothing Problem, we will need a new kind of principle. We now turn to 
alternatives inspired by work on dyadic conditional obligations (Hansson 1969; Lewis 1973; 
Comesaña 2015). Here is the simplest. (We write ‘PE(B/¬A)’ to mean that B is permissible 
                                               
6 Horton doesn’t see this case as a counterexample to NOTHING ELSE LEFT; he just uses NOTHING ELSE 
LEFT to generate the All or Nothing Problem.  
7 For early discussions of cases like this one, see: Fried & Parfit 1979; Parfit 1982; Kagan 1989: 16. For 
more recent discussions, see: Wessels 2015; Pummer 2016; Pummer forthcoming; McMahan 2018; Sinclair 
2018; Frowe 2019; Portmore 2019: §6.4; Bader 2019; Pummer 2019, Muñoz 2020; Rulli 2020. 
8 Some writers argue that saving zero is morally better than saving only one, which suggests that if you 
won’t save two, you must indeed save zero. This is not our preferred solution to the All or Nothing Problem 
(for that see Pummer 2019; Muñoz 2020), but it is an important contender, and it should not be ruled out a 
priori. Later we will show how to express this kind of view—defended by Lazar and Barry ms and Tucker 
ms—within our framework (fn. 30). 
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conditional on not doing A; ‘iff’ means ‘if and only if’.)9 
 
NEXT BEST: PE(B/¬A) iff B is the best option compatible with ¬A. 
 
In other words: if you won’t do A, you may do the best option left on the menu besides A. (And 
you are conditionally obligated to choose from your conditionally permissible options.)10 
A perk of NEXT BEST is that it can give advice to agents who will act contrary to duty. If 
you will murder, you must murder gently, because even though any murder is worse than no 
murder, gentle murder is the next best option (assuming your only options are murdering brutally, 
murdering gently, and refraining from murdering altogether). But NEXT BEST, like NOTHING ELSE 
LEFT, struggles with the consistent-with-duty permissions of the All or Nothing Problem. NEXT 
BEST implies that, if you will not Save Two, you must Save One. This seems too demanding. If 
there were just one person in the building, you would not have to sacrifice your legs to save them. 
This sacrifice would be supererogatory. So why should that same tradeoff be obligatory, 
conditional on not saving both strangers in the All or Nothing Problem? It ought to be conditionally 
optional. 
This leads Pummer (2019: 286) to offer the following revised principle, which like 
                                               
9 We use the dyadic conditional operator PE(_/_) without defining it in terms of a conditional and the 
monadic operator PE(_). We do not claim that such a definition is impossible; we just wish to abstract away 
from irrelevant controversies about, e.g., the proper syntax of ‘if’ (on which, see Kratzer 2012: Chapter 4). 
For simplicity, we talk as though the arguments of PE(_/_) as options, i.e., things that an agent could do, 
like murder gently. Officially, the arguments are propositions, like <Jack will murder gently>. 
10 We assume that obligation and permission are interdefinable: what you are obligated to do is to pick some 
or other permissible option, and what you are permitted to do is to pick an option consistent with your 
obligations. PE(A) iff ¬OB(¬A). This rules out dilemmas, but dilemmas are not our topic here (for 
discussion of contrary-to-duty scenarios and deontic dilemmas, see Kiesewetter 2018). Note also that on a 
dyadic interpretation of conditional obligations, the inference from ‘OB(A or B)’ to ‘OB(A/¬B)’ is invalid 
(Pummer 2019: 286). This inference, as well as various forms of deontic detachment, is valid on wide-




NOTHING ELSE LEFT involves a bridge from non-conditional to conditional deontic statuses: 
 
OKAY OR NEXT BEST: PE(B/¬A) iff (i) PE(B), or (ii) B is the best option compatible with 
¬A.11 
 
Think of it like this. Options that are non-conditionally permissible will remain conditionally 
permissible, but if an option is non-conditionally wrong only because it is worse than A, then it 
will be permissible conditional on not doing A.  
         OKAY OR NEXT BEST, like NOTHING ELSE LEFT, gets the right answer in the simple 
supererogation case. If you won’t Save Two (cost: your legs), then you must Save One (cost: free!). 
That is the next best option, and the only one that’s non-conditionally permissible. 
Moreover, with OKAY OR NEXT BEST, we can solve the All or Nothing Problem. 
Conditional on not saving two, you may save either one or zero. Because Save Zero is non-
conditionally permissible, it is also conditionally permissible. Save One, meanwhile, is 
conditionally permissible for a different reason: it is the next best option, given that you won’t 
Save Two. OKAY OR NEXT BEST thus implies that saving the one stranger is an instance of 
conditional permission—indeed, of consistent-with-duty conditional supererogation.12 In this sort 
of case, OKAY OR NEXT BEST performs better than NOTHING ELSE LEFT. 
You might wonder, “Who cares about conditional permissions? What kind of guidance do 
                                               
11 ‘PE(B)’, of course, means that B is non-conditionally permissible. If desired, we could define this as 
permission conditional on a tautology: PE(B) =df PE(B/A or ¬A). 
12 Note that this conditional permission (to save one stranger) is “contrary to duty” in one sense, but not in 
the sense that we have been using so far. The condition is not a wrong action; it is the permissible omission 
of a supererogatory action, namely, saving two. That said, the act of saving the one is itself wrong, non-
conditionally. So the act is itself contrary-to-duty, even though the moral permission to do it is not 
conditioned on a transgression of duty. 
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we get from hearing that an option is conditionally permissible?” Of course, we don’t get the same 
direct guidance—“do this!”—that we would get from non-conditional obligations. But again, this 
guidance isn’t for everyone. Wrongdoers, like the would-be gentle murderer, need the guidance of 
conditional obligations as a supplement. Non-supererogators, meanwhile, need conditional 
permissions as a replacement for inapt guidance that they might otherwise receive. At the outset 
of deliberation, morality tells you to avoid Save One—it’s decisively worse than Save Two. But 
that advice is outdated as soon as you exclude Save Two from deliberation; morality should not be 
guiding you away from Save One towards Save Zero. We don’t want a conditional requirement to 
save nobody if not everybody. If that’s right, conditional permissions are crucial, as they preempt 
the disastrous imperative to move from second-best to very worst.13 
 
4. The Hardest Case: Contrary to Duty, Beyond the Call 
We have seen that there are counterexamples to NOTHING ELSE LEFT in cases of wrong but 
conditionally permissible actions. Are there any counterexamples to OKAY OR NEXT BEST? We 
believe further cases of conditional supererogation do indeed yield such counterexamples. 
First consider Kamm’s (1985) influential example from “Supererogation and Obligation.” 
You have three options: you can Keep Your Promise to meet a friend for lunch (permissible), break 
your promise to Do Nothing at home (wrong), or break your promise to Save One stranger’s life 
at great cost to yourself (supererogatory). Save One is the best option compatible with excluding 
Keep Your Promise. So, according to OKAY OR NEXT BEST, if you won’t Keep Your Promise, you 
                                               
13 See Pummer 2019: 285. (Of course, this point will not be persuasive to those who think that Save Zero is 
better than Save One; see the discussion of Lazar and Barry in fn. 8, above.) 
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must Save One, which costs you your legs.14 But this is not plausible, as Kamm herself observes.15 
After all, even though you can’t justify Do Nothing over Keep Your Promise, since there is a 
negligible difference in costs to you, it is much costlier to Save One, and so it seems you may 
invoke the costs of heroism to justify your choice to Do Nothing instead.16 
In Kamm’s case (which has not been widely discussed in the context of conditional 
obligations), there is a conflict between supererogation and what would ordinarily be an 
obligation—viz., Keep Your Promise.17 It is supererogatory to Save One, and indeed it should 
remain supererogatory even if you are not going to keep the promise. Life-saving is thus 
conditionally and non-conditionally supererogatory.18 
So why does OKAY OR NEXT BEST struggle to get the right result in Kamm’s case? Perhaps 
the problem is that the next best option if you won’t Keep Your Promise (namely, Save One) is 
really a supererogatory option, which shouldn’t be a duty even conditionally. This suggests a 
tweak: 
 
                                               
14 The same implication follows from NOTHING ELSE LEFT. If you do not keep the promise, there is only 
one permissible option left—saving the life. 
15 Kamm writes: “The view is also problematic if it implies (and perhaps it does not) that if I fail to do my 
particular duty in order to do a supererogatory act, I am then obliged to do that supererogatory act. Although 
the pressure on me may increase to do the supererogatory act, I do not believe that failing my lunch date 
will necessarily leave me with a duty to give up my kidney to save someone” (1996: 318). (In her example, 
saving the life involves a kidney transplant rather than a rescue mission.) 
16 Some will say that that, since you must avoid getting your hands dirty by doing nothing, you are obligated 
to Save One if you do not Keep Your Promise. We disagree, but again (see fns. 8 and 30), our framework 
is flexible enough to accommodate this intuition. 
17 Kamm’s case is famous because it seems to involve a nontransitivity: you may do nothing rather than 
save the life (in a pairwise choice), you may save the life rather than keep your promise, but you may not 
do nothing rather than keep your promise. For discussion, see Archer 2016; Portmore 2003 (314-6), 2017; 
Muñoz 2020. 
18 Even if it were obligatory to keep the promise in Kamm’s case, OKAY OR NEXT BEST would still wrongly 
imply that you must save the life if you won’t keep the promise. Doing nothing isn’t “okay,” nor is it the 
next best option after promise-keeping. For a similar case to this interpretation of Kamm’s case, see the 
“Two Buttons” example below. 
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OKAY OR NEXT BEST*: PE(B/¬A) iff (i) PE(B), (ii) B is the best option compatible with 
¬A, or (iii) the only alternative to B (that is compatible with ¬A) is supererogatory.  
 
The tweaked principle gets the right answer in Kamm’s case: Do Nothing is permissible if you 
don’t Keep Your Promise, because the only alternative—Save One—is supererogatory. (That is to 
say, it’s non-conditionally supererogatory.) 
But Kamm’s case is not so easily dealt with. For one thing, the modified principle 
overgenerates conditional permissions. Suppose that you have three options: Keep Your Promise 
(permissible), Save One at great cost (supererogatory), or go on a Murderous Rampage (very 
wrong). Murder is impermissible, even conditional on not keeping the promise. But OKAY OR 
NEXT BEST* implies that the rampage is conditionally permissible, since the only alternative left 
(Save One) is supererogatory. That is ridiculous. 
What’s more, both versions of OKAY OR NEXT BEST seem to undergenerate conditional 
permissions. They fail to accommodate cases of contrary-to-duty conditional supererogation. 
Suppose Alice is safe and Betty is in mortal danger.19 There are two buttons before you: 
Buttons A and B. Pressing either button will seriously harm Alice without her consent, causing her 
to lose her legs. But if you Press B, that will have two more effects: you will also lose your legs, 
and Betty’s life will be saved. While it’s true that if you Press B you will save Betty’s life, you are 
not required to do so. And pressing either button is wrong, given the harm caused to Alice. Now 
here is the key point. It is not true that, if you are going to harm Alice, then you must save Betty. 
You are not required to Press B conditional on pressing a button. Why not? Sacrificing your legs 
to save a stranger is paradigmatically supererogatory. It is also, effectively, what you are doing 
                                               
19 This case is much cleaner thanks to comments from Kerah Gordon-Solmon. 
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when you Press B rather than Press A. That is why we think Press B is not obligatory conditional 
on pressing a button. Instead, Press B is conditionally supererogatory. And since the condition is 
a wrong act (namely, button-pressing), we have an instance of contrary-to-duty conditional 
supererogation.20 Even if one does not share these judgments, they are substantive judgments that 
are worth taking seriously; they should not be ruled out from the start by an account of conditional 
permissions and obligations. 
This spells trouble for existing views of conditional obligation. OKAY OR NEXT BEST 
implies that, if you are going to press a button, you must Press B, since that is the best option 
besides not pressing anything. We get the same result, for the same reason, from OKAY OR NEXT 
BEST*. This seems extreme—a kind of fanatical moral offsetting. If you eschew the moral 
minimum, you may be obliged to make sacrifices that seem wildly disproportionate. (In Kamm’s 
case, a broken lunch date compels you to sacrifice your legs. Better not skip dinner!)21 Again, this 
view is substantive and controversial; it shouldn’t trivially follow from our theory of conditional 
moral judgments. 
There is an objection lurking.22 Supererogatory acts are supposed to be good, but pressing 
button B is bad—how could a bad act be supererogatory, even conditionally? Our answer is that, 
                                               
20 In our Two Buttons example, the “contrary-to-duty” options all violate a deontological restriction—
Alice’s right against harm. This is not essential to the case. In another version, suppose that you can either 
do nothing, Press C to costlessly save 100 lives, or Press D to donate your kidney to save a stranger named 
Debbie. You aren’t obligated to Press D if you won’t Press C. (Deontological restrictions are also 
inessential, by the way, to Kamm’s case, in which Do Nothing and Save One both break a promise. In 
another version, suppose that you are choosing between doing nothing, giving your legs to save a life, and 
costlessly saving another stranger’s finger from being crushed. The only permissible options are Save One 
and Save the Finger, but conditional on not saving the finger, Save One is supererogatory, not obligatory.) 
21 There is also a worry about diachronic inconsistency. Consider the Two Buttons case. On the “offsetting” 
view, you have to sacrifice your legs to save Betty’s life if you are going to harm Alice. But if the choice 
to harm and the choice to save take place at different times, the choice looks radically different. Harming 
Alice on Monday doesn’t obligate you to heroically sacrifice for Betty on Tuesday. (This is especially clear 
if the harm to Alice is low and the cost of saving Betty is high.) 
22 We owe this objection to a helpful anonymous referee. 
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on the standard definition, supererogation is not always good in some absolute sense; it is just 
comparatively better than a permissible alternative (see Muñoz 2021b). Conditionally 
supererogatory acts, therefore, just need to be better than a conditionally permissible alternative, 
and Press B is indeed better than Press A.  
In the All or Nothing Problem, it is wrong to save one stranger rather than both, even 
though saving one at great cost to yourself is better than saving zero. Likewise, in our Two Buttons 
case, pressing B (causing Alice to lose her legs, causing you to lose your legs, and saving Betty’s 
life) is wrong even though it costs you greatly and is better than pressing A (simply causing Alice 
to lose her legs). Both actions are unambiguously wrong. Each is decisively ruled out by an 
alternative. And yet, each represents a remarkably good sacrifice in comparison to a third option. 
That is the phenomenon that we can capture with the concept of conditional supererogation. 
Judgments of conditional supererogation guide agents toward the best remaining options while 
still acknowledging that betterness may come at a serious cost, which might justify refraining. So 
far, we have not found any principle that can make sense of wrong acts that are conditionally 
supererogatory. 
 
5. A Solution: Justifying and Requiring 
Let’s take stock. 
 We have raised problems for two principles of conditional obligation. The first, NOTHING 
ELSE LEFT, holds that we are conditionally obligated to pick from our remaining permissible 
options—if there are any. This principle fails in a case of consistent-with-duty conditional 
supererogation: the All or Nothing Problem, where saving one stranger is permissible, indeed 
supererogatory, conditional on not saving two. This problem can be solved with a second principle, 
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OKAY OR NEXT BEST, which conditionally permits saving one because it is the best option left, if 
you won’t save two. But this principle, even if modified, cannot handle contrary-to-duty 
conditional supererogation. Even if you wrongly do harm, you are not obligated to harm in the 
best possible way if the costs to you are disproportionate. 
 Why don’t these principles work? NOTHING ELSE LEFT ignores betterness. For example, in 
the All or Nothing Problem, if you will not save both, NOTHING ELSE LEFT forbids Save One even 
though this is better than Do Nothing.23 OKAY OR NEXT BEST, meanwhile, ignores costs. In the 
Two Buttons case, if you are going to press a button, OKAY OR NEXT BEST obligates you to Press 
B, even though the benefits of doing so (saving Betty) are not enough to outweigh the costs to you 
(losing your legs). If we are to make sense of these cases, we need a principle that is more flexible 
and powerful—something that directly factors in not only the justification we have to choose better 
options, but also the justification afforded by costs to the agent, whether those costs are suffered 
beyond the call (as in normal supererogation) or beneath it (as in conditional supererogation). 
 Thankfully, the key resources needed are already present in the literature on supererogation 
and normative reasons for action. In particular, we appeal to the distinction between requiring 
reasons and justifying reasons. (Sometimes this distinction it put in terms of a reason’s “requiring 
strength” versus its “justifying strength.”) A requiring reason tends to make actions obligatory. A 
justifying reason merely tends to make actions permissible.24 To illustrate, suppose I can save 
                                               
23 There is also a more formal diagnosis of the trouble that NOTHING ELSE LEFT has in the All or Nothing 
Problem. The case, as described, violates a principle that Sen (2017: Chapter 1.6*) calls BETA. According 
to BETA, if A and B are both permissible, then adding more options cannot make only one of them wrong. 
But this is what seems to happen in the All or Nothing Problem: adding the permissible Save Two makes 
Save One wrong while leaving Do Nothing permissible. In such a case, NOTHING ELSE LEFT won’t work. 
The only permissible options are Save Two and Do Nothing, and yet you needn’t Do Nothing conditional 
on ¬Save Two. NOTHING ELSE LEFT has trouble with Kamm’s case for the same reason: adding the 
permissible Keep Your Promise makes Do Nothing wrong while leaving Save One permissible. 
24 By “tends to make,” we mean “contributes towards making,” not “usually makes.” Our distinction is 
basically drawn from Gert 2004, 2007 (for a related distinction, see Greenspan 2005; for a moral version, 
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Chico’s life at the cost of my legs. I have a requiring reason to help Chico. If helping were costless, 
I would have to do it. But I don’t actually have to help, since that would cost me my legs, and I 
have a powerful reason not to harm myself. This reason isn’t itself a requiring reason. (More 
accurate: I have more justifying reason not to self-harm than I do requiring reason.) But my reason 
can still counterbalance the reason to help Chico, blocking a requirement to give aid. 
We are now in a position to observe that an act is permissible iff the justifying reason in 
favor can outweigh the requiring reason to do otherwise.25 More officially: 
 
J&R: PE(B) iff for any alternative A, the justifying reason to do B (rather than A) can 
outweigh the requiring reason to do A (rather than B). 
  
“J&R” is short for (you guessed it) “justifying and requiring.” We will assume that justifying and 
requiring reasons are somewhat, though not entirely, independent of each other. Any requiring 
reason doubles as a justifying reason, but not vice versa. There is always at least as much justifying 
reason to do an option as there is requiring reason. However, it is possible for the justifying reasons 
in favor of an option to outstrip the requiring reasons.26 
                                               
see Portmore 2011). See also Hurka and Shubert (2012) on prima facie duties (which tend to favor and 
require) versus prima facie permissions (which tend to justify), as well as Muñoz (2020) on moral reasons 
versus prerogatives. We can take (merely) justifying reasons as a primitive (Hurka & Shubert 2012), or we 
could try to understand them in other terms. One idea is that they act as “disabling conditions” on requiring 
strength (see Dancy 2004 on disablers). For a more developed view, see Muñoz 2021a on moral defense. 
25 We are using ‘reason’ here as a mass noun rather than a count noun. 
26 Since this is a paper about conditional obligation, we do not aim to defend J&R at length over rival views 
of non-conditional obligation. But we should discuss one issue. We believe that an action’s 
choiceworthiness—how strongly “favored” it is—depends only on how much requiring reason there is to 
do it. Now, some will object that purely justifying reasons are also favorers. But if that is so, it is hard to 
see how supererogation could be favored over the moral minimum. The justifying reason to keep one’s 
kidney, if it can outweigh the requiring reason to donate, will also strongly favor selfishness (Hurka & 
Shubert 2012: 9). Another objection to our view is that some reasons are purely commendatory—they favor 
without justifying or requiring (Horgan & Timmons 2010; Archer 2016; Little & Macnamara 2017). But 
this idea seems to invite odd recombinations. Suppose we sweeten a wrong act with commendatory reasons 
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This is exactly what happens in cases of supererogation. We already saw this in my simple 
choice between keeping my legs or saving Chico. But the real payoff will be applying J&R to 
many-option cases. So consider our first supererogation case: you can Save Zero (no cost), Save 
One (no cost), or Save Two (at the cost of your legs). Here, it is permissible and best to save both 
strangers. This is what there is the most requiring reason to do. It is also permissible to save just 
one, it seems, because you have a weighty justifying reason to keep your legs. But it would be 
wrong to save no one. There is more requiring reason to Save One instead, and no justifying reason 
to compensate. Save Zero and Save One are both worse than Save Two, but only the former is 
justifiably worse, in the sense that it is worse but still supported by enough justifying reason to 
keep it permissible. What makes an option wrong is being unjustifiably worse than an alternative, 
i.e., not being supported by enough justifying reason to make up for the deficit in requiring reason. 
With J&R in place, we can offer our proposed principle of conditional permissibility. 
 
CONDITIONAL J&R: PE(B/¬A) iff for any alternative C that is compatible with ¬A, the 
justifying reason to do B (rather than C) can outweigh the requiring reason to do C (rather 
than B). 
 
To see if B is permissible conditional on ¬A, we need to know how B compares to the options that 
are still being considered. If B is the best remaining option, or tied for best, it is permissible. If B 
is worse than some C, we have to ask: is it unjustifiably worse? If so, then B is conditionally wrong. 
If B is justifiably worse, then it may still be conditionally permissible. 
The core idea here is that we have a two-step process for determining permissibility 
                                               
until it is the best option—even better than the permissible alternatives. Then the optional option will be 
wrong. This seems absurd. A virtue of our view is that it rules out such possibilities. 
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conditional on ¬A. First, remove A from the set of options. Second, take each option that remains, 
and ask whether it can be justified over each of the remaining alternatives; iff the answer is “yes,” 
the option is conditionally permissible. The conditionally permissible options are the ones that are 
permissible to choose from the restricted set of options. What does it mean to say that we “remove” 
the option of doing A, when we condition on ¬A? One possibility is that we imagine a 
counterfactual scenario in which the restricted menu is the agent’s entire option set, that is, we 
consider the case in which A is not available as an option at all. This is not how we are conceiving 
of things. Rather than considering a counterfactual scenario in which A is off the menu, we are 
holding fixed A’s presence on the menu, but ignoring it in that we are not counting options as 
impermissible simply because they are unjustifiably worse than A.27 In this sense we exclude the 
option of doing A from consideration, although we still suppose that A is available: we are still 
talking about a scenario in which the agent has the ability to do A.28 
 With CONDITIONAL J&R laid out, we can next ask whether it gets the right answer in our 
hard cases. We believe it does. 
First, unlike NOTHING ELSE LEFT, our principle solves the All or Nothing Problem. Recall 
your three options: costlessly save no one, save just one stranger at the cost of your legs, or save 
this same stranger and another at no greater cost to yourself. CONDITIONAL J&R has the plausible 
implication that saving just one is permissible conditional on not saving both, since saving one is 
                                               
27 For more on conditionals as domain restrictors, see Jackson (1985: 191–92) and Kratzer (1986). 
28 Here is an example to illustrate why it might be important to hold fixed the availability of an excluded 
option. Suppose you have three options: dress up and attend a costume party (Costume), go to the party 
without dressing up (Casual), or skip the party and stay at home (Skip). Since Costume is an option, it would 
be wrong to pick Casual; it expresses disrespect to the host (let’s suppose). Intuitively, it is true here that 
you must not attend if you are not going to wear a Costume, i.e., if Costume is excluded. But if Costume 
were unavailable, there would be nothing disrespectful about Casual. The fact that one could dress up 
colors the choice between dressing casually and skipping out. That is why it is important not to imagine 
that Costume is unavailable when excluding it from consideration. (Our thanks to Joe Horton for this 
example and for many other helpful ideas.) 
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the best option compatible with not saving both. Moreover, saving zero is also permissible 
conditional on not saving both, since it is justifiably worse than saving one (which is the only other 
option left). This gives CONDITIONAL J&R an advantage over NOTHING ELSE LEFT. 
Second, CONDITIONAL J&R does better than OKAY OR NEXT BEST in Kamm’s case. Here 
your options are: Keep Your Promise (permissible), break your promise to Do Nothing (wrong), 
and break your promise to heroically Save One (supererogatory). According to OKAY OR NEXT 
BEST, if you do not Keep Your Promise, you are obligated to Save One. This seems awfully 
demanding. CONDITIONAL J&R issues no such demand. For staying home is justifiably worse than 
life-saving (despite being unjustifiably worse than promise-keeping).29 
Finally, CONDITIONAL J&R is the first principle that can handle our Two Buttons case, 
where the options are: Do Nothing (permissible); Press A, harming Alice (wrong); and Press B, 
harming Alice and saving Betty at a big cost to you (also wrong). Conditional on pressing a button, 
it is intuitively optional, not obligatory, to Press B. Pressing B would be contrary-to-duty 
conditionally supererogatory. CONDITIONAL J&R has a neat explanation. Although it is worse to 
Press A than to Press B, pressing A is justifiably worse, given the cost to you of pressing B. Press 
B is thus conditionally supererogatory. It is conditionally permissible and better than a 
conditionally permissible alternative. Since the condition is a wrong act (namely, pressing a 
                                               
29 Because Do Nothing and Keep Your Promise are (roughly) equally costly, but much less costly than 
giving your legs to Save One, there is an interesting result. You have a powerful justifying reason to Do 
Nothing rather than Save One, but not to Do Nothing rather than Keep Your Promise. This is what Muñoz 
(2020) calls a “comparative prerogative,” or what we might call a “contrastive justifying reason” (see 
Snedegar 2017 on contrastive reasons, but note that Snedegar’s (forthcoming) treatment of supererogation 
does not commit to these reasons, or to any treatment of three-option cases like Kamm’s and Horton’s). 
Admittedly, “comparative prerogative” sounds like some heavy-duty jargon. But the idea behind it should 
be uncontroversial, and the term “comparative” is inessential. The point is just that relative costs are what 
determine justifying reasons (at least, the cost-based ones). Pointing to the costs of option A, even if they 
are steep, will not justify doing B in the slightest, if B’s costs are just as big or bigger. (We would like to 
thank an anonymous referee, and Justin Snedegar, Brendan de Kenessey, Chris Tucker, and Benjamin 
Kiesewetter for helpful comments here.) 
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button), we have an instance of contrary-to-duty conditional supererogation. 
That completes our argument for CONDITIONAL J&R. The view gives powerful 
explanations and plausible verdicts on cases beyond and beneath the call of duty. The view is also 
principled. It is not an ad hoc concoction, but the natural product of a view of conditionals and a 
view of supererogation: conditionals restrict quantification, and supererogation emerges from the 
clash between justifying and requiring reasons. We do not claim that CONDITIONAL J&R is the 
only principle to avoid embarrassment in the cases we have considered above (one could mimic 
the results of CONDITIONAL J&R without appealing to the distinction between justifying and 
requiring reasons, and without even appealing to reasons at all).30 But, in order to keep things tidy, 
CONDITIONAL J&R is the only such principle we consider here. There may be even lovelier 
principles left to discover. But given the simplicity and popularity of J&R, we think CONDITIONAL 
J&R is a natural place to start looking for a theory of conditional supererogation. 
    
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we presented a series of puzzles for any theory of moral conditionals that ventures 
beyond obligation into the realm of the supererogatory. We began by presenting cases featuring 
consistent-with-duty conditional obligation (§2), consistent-with-duty conditional supererogation 
(§3), and contrary-to-duty conditional supererogation (§4), arguing that no existing principle can 
capture plausible intuitions about at least three of our cases. We then presented CONDITIONAL J&R 
and showed how it can capture plausible intuitions about all the cases (§5). Moreover, 
                                               
30 If we assume there is a (decisive) requiring reason to avoid doing what’s non-conditionally wrong 
(Darwall 2010), we can get CONDITIONAL J&R to mirror the implications of NOTHING ELSE LEFT. It would 
then imply, for instance, that if you are not going Save Two, you are obligated to Save Zero (in the case 
animating the All or Nothing Problem). As noted earlier, we do not find this to be a plausible implication, 
but some people do, and our account has the flexibility to accommodate it. 
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CONDITIONAL J&R has a principled rationale; it combines a familiar conception of conditionals 
(as restrictors on quantification) with the supererogationist’s insight that permissibility depends on 
the balance of requiring reasons and justifying reasons. It would seem that our examples—our 
three “hard cases,” and the more familiar cases of conditional obligation like the gentle murder 
paradox—for all their differences, can be given a surprisingly systematic treatment. Still, we do 
not claim that CONDITIONAL J&R is the only hope for understanding moral conditionals in the 
realm of supererogation. Our conclusion is more modest. We have found one way to solve the 
puzzles, though there may be more solutions, and indeed more puzzles, yet to be discovered. There 
may even be puzzles for our own view, and we may need to make revisions—but with any luck, 
they will be gentle.31 
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